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Listed below are the monthly letters sent to investors in 2018. It should be noted that: ***The market commentary may not necessarily be correlated with returns from Goldman Management, Inc. as trading decisions are based on an array of proprietary indicators and models.***


Thank you for your interest.

December 2017, S&P 2,674 The January letter customarily reviews GMI’s mandates and performance for the previous year. One mandate/ mission is for GMI to outperform the S&P over the Investment Cycle. The following two charts are broken into the last two Investment Cycles, comparing S&P total returns (red line, dividends included) VS GMI Prop account (“GMIPA”) inclusive of pro-forma fees (blue line) along with gross returns (green). The table below depicts the difference in performance during these cycles. **Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future returns.**


The Investment Cycle

Dates	S&P	GMIPA	Ex Fees
2/02 to 6/07	42%	150%	216%
7/07 to Present	122%	161%	260%
2/02 to Present	226%	518%	992%


S&P Total Return VS GMIPA VS Gross GMIPA February 2002 to June 2007



S&P Total Return VS GMIPA Vs Gross GMIPA July 2007 to the Present



The chart below depicts the S&P's **Cumulative Monthly Drawdowns** (red) Vs GMIPA's cumulative monthly drawdowns (blue).



The following table on the next page depicts the yearly price change in the S&P and GMIPA along with the worst yearly cumulative monthly drawdowns. Another mandate/mission is to outperform in the context of the S&P price change VS GMIPA (excluding fees) or “pure market calls” and /or to incur less volatility during the drawdowns. GMI outperformed the S&P price change last year by 240 basis points, while the cumulative monthly draw down was at -0.04%, identical to the S&P price change. From a historical perspective, the average year difference in cumulative drawdown is 470 basis points or a 45% reduction. **Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future returns.**

S&P 500 price change VS GMIPA or “Pure Market Call” (Excluding Fees) VS Worst Cumulative Monthly Drawdowns or WDD

Date	S&P ROR	GMI Gross	S&P WDD	GMI WDD	Diff in ROR	Diff in WDD
2002	-22.0%	23.2%	-29.00%	-5.23%	45.2%	-23.8%
2003	26.4%	55.7%	-4.39%	-2.03%	29.3%	-2.4%
2004	9.0%	10.4%	-3.30%	-6.26%	1.4%	3.0%
2005	3.0%	12.3%	-4.56%	-3.80%	9.3%	-0.8%
2006	13.6%	23.8%	-3.10%	-5.95%	10.2%	2.9%
2007	3.5%	5.7%	-5.23%	-6.92%	2.2%	1.7%
2008	-38.5%	10.9%	-39.00%	-4.27%	49.4%	-34.7%
2009	23.5%	22.5%	-18.60%	-11.73%	-1.0%	-6.9%
2010	12.8%	14.9%	-13.15%	-14.42%	2.1%	1.3%
2011	0.0%	5.3%	-17.07%	-6.38%	5.3%	-10.7%
2012	13.4%	7.8%	-7.00%	-6.20%	-5.6%	-0.8%
2013	29.6%	32.8%	-3.10%	-2.77%	3.2%	-0.3%
2014	11.4%	11.9%	-3.60%	-3.99%	0.5%	0.4%
2015	-0.7%	-0.5%	-8.75%	-5.93%	0.2%	-2.8%
2016	9.5%	9.8%	-5.49%	-4.12%	0.3%	-1.4%
2017	19.4%	21.8%	0.00%	0.00%	2.4%	0.0%
AVG	5.5%	16.8%	-10.33%	-5.63%	11.4%	-4.71%

The table below lists six mandates: No losing years and a minimum gross return greater than 5% (since 2002 in only one year has this mandate not been achieved). Annual monthly peak to trough in equity under 6%; historical average is 5.5%, and -3.6% is the average decline in the past six years. A 70-100% recovery rate on the worse yearly draw down should be achieved within three months, the average is 2.7 months. A Sharpe Ratio greater or equal to 1, similar to the long-term average, while the S&P's historical average is roughly 0.55. Outperform the S&P 500 yearly price change on a gross basis. Profitable months 66% of the time. Beta not a mandate, although was less than the market - or less than 1.

Mandates/ Mission	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013
No losing years, gross returns >5.0%	21.8%	9.8%	-5%	11.9%	32.8%
Monthly peak to trough in equity <=-5.5% (avg.)	0.04%	-4.0%	-5.9%	3.95%	-2.7%
Sharpe ratio >=1 (average =1.1)	4.16	1.0	No	1.15	3.03
Worse yearly DD, months to recover 70% to 100% of losses in months	1 mo.	1 mo.	1 mo.	1 mo.	1 mo.
Outperform the S&P 500 price index on a gross basis	240	25	20	100	310
Profitable months=68% (average)	92%	50%	42%	66%	83%
Beta	0.82	0.7	0.69	0.94	0.85

January, S&P 2,824 GMI celebrated the 16th year of its audited track record at month's end (unaudited from 1987) and a few milestones can be noted. Gross returns last month surpassed 1,000% (the chart is depicted on page 3) finishing the month with a gain of 1,050% Vs the S&P's total return of 254%. The ex. fee IRR rate of return stands at 16.5% or an average yearly return greater than 17%. After leaving Weeden & Co. 6 years ago, for the first time AUM nearly reached \$100 million last month, reflecting a 100% increase in the past year. My personal financial commitment remains resolute with the continuous investment of 100% of my liquid net worth.

At month's end the S&P's winning streak without a 5% correction reached its 400th day. The previous streak ended in the summer of 1996 after lasting 394 days. Late note: The S&P declined below this level a few days into February. The S&P during the 1996 period gained 41.4%, while in this streak the S&P has gained 41.6%. For the record, after the last three streaks ended the S&P managed to reverse the decline that followed and renew the rally for at least another six months. A review of the two prior streaks which date from to the 1950's to 1962, shows a less fortunate outcome as other factors entered into the equation and a rebound failed to materialize.

A correlation analysis in the stock market's trading pattern for the past two years ending September reveals what has historically been a favorable outcome for stock prices over the two quarters that follow. There have been four other occurrences since the 1920's. On average the S&P has been higher over the next two quarters 100% of the time, the average gain six months later was 9% and for the record the S&P at its recent high exceeded those projections with a 13% advance.

Using another permutation on S&P's correlation analysis also ending September shows a historical gain of 7% three months later and for the record the S&P this time around advanced by 6.15%. Six months later the S&P had historically advanced by 10.7% and this time around the S&P exceeded those projections with an advance of 13%.

The two shallowest declines in the S&P in a year excluding last year's 2.8% decline, were in 1995 with a 2.5% decline and in 1964 with a 3.5% decline. In the first month of the following year the S&P in 1996 advanced by 3.25% and in January 1966 advanced by 3.3% Vs a 5.6% gain last month.

The S&P's unabated rise is a rare phenomenon. One yardstick to quantify this uncommon advance can be found by monitoring the relative strength index or **RSI**. **RSI** is a momentum indicator that compares the magnitude of recent gains and losses over a specified time period to measure speed and change of price movements of a security or an Index. Most traders that monitor this gauge will use a 14- bar measurement to track overbought /oversold levels, using daily, weekly or monthly bars. On a monthly basis at month's end the 14-month RSI on the S&P reached 88, nearly a record. There have been a few periods near this lofty level in 1955, 1986 and 1996, and all suggested in the intermediate term outlook this level is not a concerning factor. On a weekly basis the reading rose to above 85 in the first week of trading this year which is very rare with only two other such occurrences, then peaked at 90 by month's end. The daily reading rose above 86 at the recent highs, one of only a few such incidences and the S&P did undergo a consolidation after reaching this threshold.

Late Note: The S&P was vulnerable to a consolidation/pullback entering the month. The breakout in bond yields to a multi-year high with a 20-basis point jump in yields in the past two weeks and nine basis points rise last Friday alone were the direct drivers for the stock market's decline. The market decline this week was much greater than anticipated and may have been a function of a massive margin call which astonishingly led to VIX reaching 50, a level which in the past has been associated with an event; Russian Crisis 1998, Recession 2002, 2008, Greece Crisis 2010, Sovereign debt concerns 2011. The narrative presently, driven by the potential for higher rates is on a relative basis not as concerning. Additionally, sharp market declines occurring after recent highs are typically not as worrisome.

S&P is in the midst earnings season and as stated nearly two years ago, earnings revisions based on the inputs that we use for modeling continue to suggest stability in the S&P 500 forecasts at least over the next two quarters. Earnings are expected to grow 12.2% for the quarter and if history is a guide this deep into the quarter, the outcome is likely to rise above 15% when finalized.

February, S&P 2,714 As stated in the last month's letter to investors on 2/7, "the market decline was much greater than anticipated and may have been a function of a massive margin call which astonishingly led to VIX reaching 50, a level which in the past has been associated with macro events; Russian Crisis 1998, Recessions 2002 and 2008, Greece Crisis 2010, Sovereign debt concerns 2011. The narrative presently, driven by the potential for higher rates, is on a relative basis is not as concerning".

Following the recent regime of low volatility and given the recent turbulence, it would be appropriate & timely to review prior bouts of volatility and how GMI's investors were impacted. Going back to 2002, during the two worst market declines - February 2002 to September 2002 and July 2007 to February 2009- the S&P declined cumulatively by -79%. GMI's gross cumulative returns during these two-time spans gained 2%. The table on the next page reflects a more granular focus and reviews the S&P's worst performances since 2002 VS GMI. The four largest monthly declines in the S&P totaled a cumulative loss of -48%, while GMI during these periods gained 2.22% and was higher in three out of four months. The average monthly decline in the S&P in the table was -8.22% while GMI declined on average -1.91% or an estimated exposure ratio of 23%. ($1.91 / 8.22 = 23\%$). Only two times was the **net exposure ratio greater than 90% (GMI divided by S&P)**, first in January 2009 when GMI declined 9.1% and then gained 12.2% four months later, and second in May 2010 where after an -8.25% decline GMI gained 14.3% over the following eight months. Two times when **net exposure varied from 62% to 72%** and monthly declines were greater than -4.5% were in July 2002 where after a -5.1% decline GMI gained 25.9% four month later, followed by May 2012 where after a 4.6% decline the gain was 8.5% eight months later. Conversely, reviewing the best 20 monthly gains by the S&P, the average gain is 7.05% Vs 5.56% for GMI net of fees, or a 79% exposure, and over 100% of the gains before fees (the table is not included). In sum, GMI has managed to weather the market turbulence either on a monthly basis or over the next quarter or two. **PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS**

The S&P's Worse Monthly Returns Since 2002 VS GMI Returns

Worse Months	S&P Worst Declines	GMI	GMI/S&P
10/1/2008	-16.83%	2.58%	-15.34%
2/1/2009	-10.99%	-2.99%	27.22%
9/1/2002	-10.97%	0.58%	-5.29%
9/1/2008	-9.21%	2.05%	-22.24%
6/1/2008	-8.60%	-4.27%	49.62%
1/1/2009	-8.58%	-9.13%	106.40%
5/1/2010	-8.20%	-8.25%	100.58%
7/1/2002	-7.93%	-5.06%	63.83%
11/1/2008	-7.54%	-0.42%	5.58%
6/1/2002	-7.22%	4.76%	-65.88%
9/1/2011	-7.20%	-0.14%	1.96%
5/1/2012	-6.30%	-4.6%	72.34%
8/1/2015	-6.27%	-4.30%	68.60%
4/1/2002	-6.14%	-0.40%	6.53%
1/1/2008	-6.11%	-0.07%	1.13%
12/1/2002	-6.02%	-1.21%	20.0%
8/1/2011	-5.70%	-1.71%	30.0%
AVG	-8.22%	-1.91%	23.10%

PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS

Using a correlation study going back to 1900 on the Dow Jones average and comparing the most recent downturn with similar historical downturns reveals sharply higher prices over the next four and 8 weeks. Using data from 1950, there have been 15 such occurrences. This time around just two weeks after the signal came into effect the S&P surpassed the four-week projection and very nearly the eight-week projection with an advance of 7.75%. For the record, the 11-day advance at 7.75% exceeded all other 11-day advances in this study.


The parallels between 2017 and 1964 have been discussed exhaustively in the past year and touch the eventual concerns in a tightening cycle circling around fears of a disorderly rise in market interest rates. In a slow cycle the process tends to be lengthier before concerns surface as compared to a fast cycle. 2017 and 1964 were the only two periods when a tightening cycle lasted into the 24th month **and** market rates flatlined following the initial hike in rates. Market volatility in 2017 and 1964 was also similar, and both also saw the S&P move higher nearly each month in the calendar year, in fact higher in 11 out of 12 months. Following the analog, in the following year, 1965, the S&P did decline by 10% in a month only to upright itself, moving back to new highs in a couple of months. A warranted decline for stock prices did manifest in 1966 when rates rose by 100 basis points to nearly 5%. Presently Interest rates are 200-basis lower than in 1966, while forward PE's between these two periods are somewhat similar.

March, S&P 2,641 Goldman Management for the second consecutive year was nominated by Barclay Hedge Fund Data Base/CME Pinnacle Awards in the Non-Diversified category for both its one and five-year performance. Last year GMI was the recipient of this award based on its five-year performance.

A plethora of exogenous factors including news stories, tweets and White House missives were at minimum partial drivers for stock prices over the last few weeks of the month. Inflationary concerns and the VIX unwinding pressures from early February ebbed while steel tariff concerns surfaced early in the month. That was followed by a gentler narrative regarding the steel tariffs, relieving the alarm perceived in the initial market swoon. A second round of tariffs was centered around China but after another bout of market jitters, fresh negotiations are now underway, easing some of these concerns. Facebook woes took hold by mid-month and were then followed by the mishaps in A.I connected to autonomous cars on March 27 (3.32% decline in the NASDAQ 100). This was followed by tweets regarding Amazon on March 28th March 29th and into the first few days into April. The overall assumption last month was that these singular news items are not “game changing events”, although collectively these exogenous inputs have taken their toll on stock prices.

In summary, as stated above a persistent and unusual supply of news stories have triggered substantial gyrations in stock prices in the past couple of months. The chart on the next page depicts the S&P along with two other gauges that can partially track impactful news stories. One is Economic Policy Uncertainty (“EPU”), the bottom chart, which is an index to measure economic uncertainty. The Index is comprised of three components; newspaper coverage, federal tax code provisions set to expire in future years and disagreement among economic forecasters as a proxy for uncertainty. The data series compiled is monthly and the inception dates from January 1985. The other data series is called the Geopolitical Risk Index (“GRI”), the second from the top chart. This Index is compiled counting the words related to geopolitical tensions in leading international newspapers, using 11 newspapers since 1985. The data is monthly and remarkably the data on this series is available from 1899.

GRI based on the recent data rose to 286 in the March 12th release, the next update is scheduled for April 10th. GRI at mid-month rose to 286, the highest level since March 2003 which coincided with the bear market bottom although the level then rose to 455. Prior peaks in this indicator were 344, which occurred at the bear market bottom in October 2001 and in January 1991 at 369. In sum, historically the chart has captured elevated news concerns typically after large market events and has peaked near market bottoms. The current magnitude of elevation is rare in the absence of a significant market event. Economic Policy Uncertainty had been tamed (although the one-year level is considered somewhat elevated) after spiking following the Presidential election. The latest reading rose to 155, the highest in a year. The last chart combines these two indicators.



Stock prices in the long run are tethered to earnings. They are also partly influenced by interest rates, risk premiums, inflation etc... From a broader perspective, observing the S&P since the end of 2010 or roughly two years after the financial crisis and using the end point of March 23rd shows an advance of 106.81%. According to the data from FactSet earnings on the S&P 500 at year end are expected at \$157.70 or an increase of 81.25% since the end of 2010. Risk premiums and bond yields are presently modestly lower than at the end of 2010. Using a formula to standardize valuations suggests valuations at the end of 2010 are similar to the present levels based on the S&P's close on March 23rd (2,588.36). Additionally, the S&P's forward PE touched 16.00, which was not dissimilar to the S&P ratio entering the last quarter of 2013, which is considered a decent ratio in a low inflationary environment. The Forward PE ratios for the S&P 400 Midcap and the S&P Small cap have similarly converged around this level as well.

The S&P has been above its 200- day moving average for roughly 440 days, the fifth longest streak since 1950. Late note: the S&P violated this average on April 2nd. The previous longest streak ended Oct 10, 2014 and the S&P gained 6.40% three months later after breaking below its 200-day average. In the three other streaks greater than 400 days the S&P also moved higher 3 months later after initially declining below the moving average and breaking the streak.

May, S&P 2,649 Trade friction may be an overshadowing concern and domestic stocks which less directly affective by trade and commonly found in second tier stock indexes Vs the blue-chip brethren (S&P) have been more resilient. As of May 2nd the S&P stood 7.8% off its recent highs, while the S&P 600 Small Cap. Stood 2.5% from its recent highs, 3.3% for the Russell 2,000 Smallest Cap and 5.6% for the S&P 400 Mid Cap.

As mentioned last month “a plethora of exogenous factors including news stories, tweets and White House missives were at minimum partial drivers for stock prices over the last few weeks of the month.” Another factor that may have also played a part in the volatility was when the S&P traded lower YTD. On March 22 the S&P declined by 2.52% and closed that session lower on the year. From March 22 over the next 11 trading sessions almost half the days experienced a decline greater than -1.40% and during this time span the S&P failed to move into positive territory for the year. Despite a series of daily market declines greater than 1.40%, the S&P's trading range was relatively narrow at 4.76%. This pattern is somewhat reminiscent of August 20th, 2015 when the S&P lost 2.11%, finishing that session with a YTD decline. From August 20th 2015 and over the next 11 trading sessions more than half the trading sessions lost -1.40% or more. Since 1950 there have been 6 such similar occurrences and 5 occurred after the S&P was lower on the year. Additionally, in the first 85 trading days of this year there have been more than 12 sessions that the S&P has declined by 1.4% or more. Historically there have been just 5 other occurrences since 1950 or an occurrence in less than 10% of all years. All of these periods at one point were lower YTD.

One Econometric Model shifted into an economic acceleration mode 16 months ago. Reviewing this Econometric Model since 1995 or over the past 280 months, just 17.50% of the time has this acceleration phase been in effect. When stock prices are in a benign interest rate environment and economic acceleration mode, the S&P on average has traded 6.00% over its 9-month moving average. For the record the S&P at the end of January was 10.42% over its 9-month average, 4.74% by February and only 1.00% by the end of March and April. In the 48 months when in this acceleration mode, only eight times has the S&P not traded 3.25% above its 9-month moving average or just 16.66% of the time. Since 1995, the S&P's end of March performance while in this acceleration mode was the 7th lowest ratio. Clusters of underperformance were encountered in the second half of 2004 when in this acceleration mode, but the S&P did eventually rally three to six months later. From a longer perspective and not since 1995 but since 1950, when in an economic acceleration mode, the S&P has averaged 4.00% above its nine-month moving average. In the decade of the 1950's when interest rates were relatively benign the S&P in this acceleration mode averaged 8.44% above its nine-month average. In past periods when inflation has become more problematic, the spread has tended to be below its historical norm. Additional filters can be utilized, but in this study is not being implemented.

S&P earnings based on the week ending 4/27 saw 53% of the companies reporting earnings. The blended growth rate was at 23.2% and if the quarter ends at that level, growth would have been the highest since Q3 2010 (34.00%). Earnings estimates for 2018 have risen to \$158.94 from \$157.70 over the last month according to Factset. Earnings' beat rate (earnings results exceeded analyst's expectations) exceeded 80%, only seen once before in the 25 years. In October 2009 as we were emerging from the Great Recession the beat rate rose to nearly 85.00%. During last month, the S&P's forward PE ratio moved back to its five-year average at just over 16.00. Since 1900 the forward PE ratio has averaged 15.4. By year's end, S&P earnings since 2010 will likely have increased by 82.80% while the S&P has risen by 110.00%, 105.00% if using the closing lows on the year. Risk premiums and credit spreads have contracted since 2010.

PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS

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